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From ‘social problems’ to citizenship 
Since the 1960s research on immigration and integration in the Federal 
Republic of Germany has evolved from an emphasis on ‘social problems’ of 
labor migrants (Ausliinderforschung) to questions of immigration control, 
citizenship and ethnic pluralism (‘multiculturalism’). Early research on mi- 
gration in the 1960s and 1970s dealt with the specific problems associated 
with the recruitment of labor migrants, i.e. their labor market position, 
housing, education and the transition from school to work of their children 
and the economic effects of ‘guestworker’ employment on the German econ- 
omy (Reuter & Dodenhoeft 1988). This research gradually became connected 
to a wider historical perspective on migration, including emigration from 
Germany in the 19th century and immigration of groups such as Poles in the 
late 19th century, forced laborers during World War Two, expellees during 
the Cold War and labor migrants since the 1960s (cf. Bade 1984, 1992). With 
the settlement of labor migrants in the 1970s and 1980s, the steep increase 
of asylum seekers, and a renewed influx of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) from 
Eastern Europe during the 1980s and early 1990s, immigration has come to 
occupy center stage as a policy issue. In the course of these developments 
came the realization that Germany is a ‘de-facto immigration country’ (Heck- 
mann 1981), or an ‘undeclared immigration country’ (Thranhardt 1988). It 
was only gradually that political science research in Germany began to ad- 
dress the distribution of membership and citizenship rights in the German 
polity - with a primary focus on political rights and naturalization. 
High levels of immigration in Germany have been accompanied by long- 
term structural developments, such as a restructuration of labor markets, the 
‘crisis of the welfare state’ and seminal events such .as German unification. 
In the early 1990s political conflict and academic debates on immigration 
and integration came to focus on the asylum question. The debate on asylum 
that went through several cycles in the 1980s and early 1990s drew attention 
to the question of immigration control and the consequences of migration 
for the welfare state. These developments raise questions such as: Why has 
the debate on immigration in Germany centered around the question of 
political asylum? Moreover, the gradual settlement of labor migrants 
(‘guestworkers’) in the 1970s and 1980s raised the question of naturalization 
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and access to citizenship rights. Has the German regulation of citizenship, 
based on the blood principle (ius sanguinis), stood in the way of political 
integration of de-facto immigrants? What are suitable institutional mechan- 
isms to ‘manage’ a multiethnic society, e.g. minority rights, cultural auton- 
omy, and affirmative action? Not only political rights of immigrants have 
become contentious. Also, as the emerging debate on ‘welfare chauvinism’ 
suggests, social rights of migrants are being contested. Is there such a thing 
as ‘welfare chauvinism’, the fear among groups in the native population 
(and settled immigrants) that certain new immigrant groups take away jobs, 
housing and social services? Is there a widespread unwillingness among 
the native population to share economic and social resources with certain 
immigrant groups defined as ‘others’? Does ‘welfare chauvinism’ point 
towards an ethnicization of politics, i.e. the construction and mobilization of 
ethnic boundaries around issues of distribution of welfare state resources? 
Are we in the midst of experiencing the emergence of ‘new’ cleavages built 
around ethnic identity that add another dimension to ‘old’ politics (e.g. 
capital/labor)? 
All these questions pertain directly to the distribution and contestation of 
rights, duties and membership in polities. If the distribution of membership 
and citizenship rights is the crucial problem that international migration poses 
for political science (Walzer 1983), the achievements and shortcomings of 
previous research are quite obvious. First, whereas literature has dealt with 
questions of political citizenship rights and membership (Staatsangehiirigkeir), 
it has not devoted sufficient attention to social citizenship rights and the 
corresponding problems posed by the internationalization of labor markets 
and the granting of social rights in national welfare states that are ‘closed 
systems’ (Freeman 1986). This observation also applies to literature outside 
Germany: Most efforts have dealt with political citizenship (Brubaker 1992). 
Second, if it is true that migration raises the question of the distribution of 
social rights on the domestic level, the international and transnational con- 
texts have to be considered. Research on immigration in Germany has not 
placed the political debates on asylum, ‘multiculturalism’ and xenophobia in 
an interactive perspective that analyzes the unequal distribution of resources 
and its connection to ethnicization of politics in welfare states of the ‘North’ 
to emigration and socio-economic inequalities in countries of the ‘South’. 
This review essay addresses the questions raised regarding immigration 
control, integration of migrants via political and social rights, and the con- 
comitant ethnicization of welfare state politics during the 1980s and early 
1990s. The overall focus is on the distribution of citizenship and membership 
and the political conflicts surrounding the conflicts around rights. First, the 
discussion examines regulation of immigration. Second, it turns to issues of 
political and social rights of immigrants, dealing with problems of naturaliz- 
ation and the welfare state and immigration. Third, the review focuses on 
political conflicts that have gone hand in hand with high levels of immigration, 
the ethnicization of politics. Here, ethnicization means the political construc- 
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tion and/or mobilization of boundaries between social groups that draw on 
ethnic markers. Ethnic markers and feelings of ethnic commonality - in Max 
Weber’s words ‘ethnische Gemeinsamkeit’ (cf. Weber 1976: 237, 244) - are 
‘artificial’ and constructed phenomena and are used and mobilized in political 
conflicts. The discussion concludes with some reflections on future research 
that concern the transnational aspects of immigration and integration. 
Eventually, if transnational social policy is seen as a means of immigration 
control, a question is raised about the transnationalization of social rights 
that have previously been granted exclusively at the level of individual 
national states. 
To place German literature in comparative perspective, an effort is made 
to evaluate the studies in light of comparative European and North American 
scholarship. Most German studies implicitly or explicitly refer to these litera- 
tures. For the most part this review does not include research on immigration 
into the former German Democratic Republic. Material on the GDR is very 
scarce because there was virtually no migration research under the communist 
regime. Mostly, migration research in the GDR focused on capitalist coun- 
tries.’ 
Immigration control 
The opportunity or even the right to immigrate can be seen as the first step 
in acquiring citizenship in a national state. Although German governments, 
led both by Social and Christian Democrats, have staunchly refused to offici- 
ally acknowledge a situation of immigration, there are discernible de facto 
policies of immigration and integration (Meier-Braun 1988). As already men- 
tioned Germany is a de facto immigration country with regard to labor 
migrants (Gastarbeiter), asylum seekers, expellees (Vertriebene) in the 1940s 
and 1950s, and ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) from Central and Eastern Eur- 
ope. 
The politics and policies of labor recruitment, the development of immi- 
gration control as a distinct policy field in the late 19th century until the 
1970s have been carefully documented and analyzed (Dohse 1985). Much less 
attention has been devoted to immigration and integration policies towards 
expellees from Eastern Europe and refugees from East Germany in the 1940s 
and 1950s (cf. Benz 1985) - and, later, ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe 
(mainly Poland and the former Soviet Union) in a comparative perspective, 
i.e. similarities and differences of immigration between labor migrants, ethnic 
Germans, asylum seekers and others. One thesis is that ethnic Germans are 
the most advantaged groups of all de facto immigrants due to Article 116 of 
the German constitution (Otto 1990). Article 116 and subsequent legislation 
gave ethnic Germans during the Cold War and after a quasi-automatic right 
of entry into the Federal Republic and access to German citizenship. In 
addition, they have received generous subsidies not available to other groups 
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of de facto immigrants, e.g. language and vocational training courses to help 
them integrate into labor markets. However, it is a little known fact that 
recent laws and above all, regulatory measures have curtailed the number 
of ethnic Germans admitted into the Federal Republic. Thus, the number 
of ethnic Germans admitted fell from a high of about half a million in 1990 
to about 220,000 in 1992. Israel and Japan also have similar laws of return 
that favour the descendants of former citizens in returning to the former 
sending country. Moreover, West European countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, changed their citizenship laws in 1981 and strengthened the blood 
principle as a criterion for immigration. It is questionable that we can speak 
of a German Sonderweg in regard to the special privileges ethnic Germans 
have in entering Germany. Yet, what is interesting about the preference of 
ethnic Germans over other groups of de facto immigrants is the fact that it 
is an imagined concept of ‘family’ (ius sanguinis) that is employed to legi- 
timize their admission. 
In Germany the political debate on immigration since the late 1970s has 
been a discourse on the right to political asylum. Research has dealt primarily 
with the constitutional issue of asylum and not with the causes of refugee 
flows and the reception of refugees in host countries (cf. Sollner 1992). Most 
asylum seekers in Europe apply for asylum in Germany. In no small part 
this was probably due to the fact that Germany guarantees a unique right for 
politically persecuted individuals.’ Quite a few analysts argued that because 
German asylum law is so liberal, it has led to very restrictive administrative 
rules and a comparatively low recognition rate (e.g. Cohn-Bendit & Schmid 
Empirically, the amendments to the regulations of political asylum during 
the 1980s - before the amendment of Article 16 in 1993 - were a prime 
example of non-intended consequences of short-term changes of these rules 
(Munch 1992: 64). For example, the financial burdens of paying for housing 
and food of asylum seekers rests upon the shoulders of local communities. 
Thus, in the early 1980s, work permissions were granted to asylum seekers 
in order to reduce the financial burden upon local communities. However, 
the granting of work permits to asylum seekers could have led to more 
asylum applications of those migrants who seek work in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. Thus, the liberal handling of work permits was restricted again 
until 1991 when asylum seekers were eligible for restricted work permits 
after a waiting period. 
In general, we know very little on  positions of political actors on issues of 
immigration and citizenship. Exceptions include Ute Knight and Wolfgang 
Kowalsky (1991) who analyze the positions of political parties on immigration 
in general. One of the results is that positions on immigration do not fall 
along established party lines and cleavages, such as ‘left’ vs. ‘right’ and 
‘capital’ vs. ‘labor’. Munch (1992) finds that in the politics of asylum levels 
of government matter: the federal government has had much less incentive 
to act consistently compared to Lander and local governments. The latter 
1992: 243-275). 
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had to shoulder most of the costs for housing of asylum seekers. In sum, the 
actors and cleavages in immigration and integration policy have still to be 
analysed. An exception is Wolken (1988) who deals with the political debates 
on asylum. The nonrecognition of immigration has prohibited a debate on 
immigration regulation in the 1980s and early 1990s and helped to elevate 
the constitutional issue of asylum to the center of the politics of immigration 
(Faist 1994). However, there has been little systematic analysis of possible 
cross-cutting cleavages within political parties and other macro-political ac- 
tors (Thranhardt 1993). 
Even fewer studies have systematically used a normative perspective to  
debate arguments on immigration control. Addressing the debate on asylum, 
Micha Brumlik (1993) argues that there is, in principle, an absolute right to 
immigration. Like Bruce Ackerman (1980), he contends that immigration 
restrictions are only legitimate when the sheer number and the declared 
political will of immigrants undoubtedly lead to a threat to the survival of 
the liberal political order. Immigrants can only be turned back at the border 
when we can safely assume that the refusal of entry will not threaten their 
life. In essence, Brumlik presents a universalist position, i.e. those who want 
to restrict immigration have to shoulder the burden of proof. The ideal-type 
opposite to this universalist position is a national-particularistic position that 
puts the burden of proof upon the shoulders of individual migrants. For 
example, even the liberal German asylum law asks the individual refugee to 
prove that he/she was politically persecuted in the country of origin. A 
universalist position, however, would ask about the capacity of the receiving 
countries to take in refugees that have been the object of political or econ- 
omic violence and cannot be helped in the country of origin. Seen in this 
perspective, Brunlik’s plea to reverse the burden of proof would have pro- 
found implications for immigration policies. 
Moreover, Brumlik contends that immigration should be allowed unless it 
can be shown that immigrants pose a threat to the liberal political order. It 
is unclear, however, when a threat to  the liberal political order exists. For 
example, are Islamic fundamentalists a threat to  Germany democracy? In 
practice, the existence of such a rule could even increase possibilities for 
right-wing and xenophobic movements to influence the debate over immi- 
gration in calling any kind of unwelcome migration a threat to the political 
order. 
Rainer Baubock (1992) argues that it is ultimately not the threat to  the 
political order, i.e. political rights, but the threat to social rights that could 
legitimate immigration control. As labor markets have become more trans- 
national, the balance of regulation of these markets, that rests upon the 
cooperation of labor unions, employer associations and state institutions, 
could be threatened. Baubock could be read to argue that high levels of 
immigration create an overabundance of cheap labor. Employer associations, 
for example, would have an incentive to opt out of the regulation of labor 
markets. Unions, in turn, would lose economic and, finally, political power. 
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In turn, this could lead to a levelling of social rights for all concerned and/or 
to specific labor market segments for migrants. It is plausible that high levels 
of immigration could result in competition for selected groups of native 
workers, i.e. there is the threat of wage dumping. Thus, high levels of 
immigration could lead to increased socio-economic inequality between 
groups in the labor market. Over the past century unions in all Western 
countries have used this argument to restrict labor immigration. Thus, Bau- 
bock has pointed towards the problem that welfare states granting social 
rights to their citizens (and the part of the foreign population) are nationally 
bounded and thus ‘closed’ systems. This closing on the level of the national 
state is in direct contrast to the internationalization of labor markets. There- 
fore, Baubock makes an argument for both immigration restrictions to pro- 
hibit a potential threat to social rights in the receiving countries and an 
extension of social rights in the transnational segments of the labor market. 
Other writers have argued in a utilitarian manner that immigration is much 
needed in order to protect the level of social rights and benefits in Germany. 
Some proponents have advanced demographic arguments. They argue that 
the ageing of the German population in the foreseeable future will lead to 
shortages in labor markets. This, so the argument goes, will have effects 
upon the social insurance system, the heart of the German welfare state. 
Since there will not be enough active labor force participants in the future 
due to over-ageing of German society, there will be shortcuts in the social 
security system. Therefore, the remedy would be to have controlled immi- 
gration to compensate for this likely effect (GeilJler 1991). However, whether 
or not ‘controlled’ immigration would have those beneficial effects for the 
German social security system is by no means clear. For example, the thesis 
depends on a continued capacity of German labor markets to absorb new 
migrants. 
Most policy proposals that deal with immigration control are oriented at 
the models of the ‘classical countries of immigration’, the United States of 
America, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Thus, for example, some 
researchers propose immigration laws for those who want to immigrate into 
Germany for economic reasons and include in quotas groups such as political 
refugees, quota refugees, relatives of immigrants, immigrants from the for- 
mer Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (with slots reserved for ethnic Ger- 
mans); and an open channel to which everybody can apply (Thranhardt 1992: 
146-153). Bade proposes institutions to administer this kind of immigration, 
including a federal agency for immigrant affairs, a system of ombudspersons, 
and research institutions (Bade 1992: 442-455). The overall-argument made 
by these authors is that immigration policy becomes more ‘calculable’ for 
the public at large. Quotas would be set by parliament in consultation with 
important societal groups. 
. In general, these proposals also favor a European harmonization of immi- 
gration and asylum policies. However, this summary call for increased coordi- 
nation harmonization of immigration policies is a double edged sword: In 
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the case of the unique liberal German asylum law harmonization has actually 
meant a further tightening of entry for refugees. 
Integration and membership: contested citizenship in the social and 
political sphere 
Citizenship rights constitute a necessary requirement of access to membership 
and thus influence the life-chances of immigrants. Overall, recent German 
literature has focussed on two concepts of citizenship as membership. It 
contrasted an ethnic understanding with a republican understanding. In gen- 
eral, the normative assumption in much of the literature has been to  look 
upon ius sanguinis as an exclusionist concept of citizenship that denies even 
the children of migrants born in Germany from German citizenship and thus 
creates a permanent class of politically disenfranchised pariahs. Instead, the 
authors discussed below hold that a republican understanding of political 
citizenship requires the principle of ius soli, i.e., those born in Germany 
should have easy assess to German citizenship. The main thrust of the 
discussion on political citizenship has thus been the nexus between national- 
ism and democracy. The principle of ‘ius sanguinis’ is held to be an expression 
of a nationalist understanding of citizenship, whereas ‘ius soli’ is understood 
to be an expression of democratic distribution of political rights. Thus, the 
argument contends with the position of a group of mostly legal scholars 
who argue in favor of the current understanding of German citizenship (cf. 
Rauscher 1987). 
Lutz Hoffmann (1990) contrasts an ethnic and a republican understanding 
of citizenship as membership. He contends that an ethnic understanding of 
citizenship is not adequate for a de facto country of immigration such as the 
Federal Republic of Germany. According to Hoffmann recruiting migrants 
without giving them adequate rights and citizenship status has created a 
situation in which a further denial of accepting Germany as a country of 
immigration would ultimately deform the democratic character of the Ger- 
man republic. He sees an ethnic nationalism (vdkischer Nationalismus) as 
the root cause of an inadequate and schizophrenic collective identity of the 
Federal Republic that has recruited foreign workers but has not responded 
adequately to the process of their settlement. Hoffmann reconstructs the 
historical evolution of ethnic nationalism in Germany over the past two 
centuries. The juxtaposition of an ‘ethnic’ and a ‘republican’ ideal of citizen- 
ship and understanding of nation is reminiscent of Kohn’s (1944) concept of 
Eastern and Western nationalism (Kulturnation versus Staarsnation), and has 
also been used by authors such as Roger Brubaker (1992) to compare the 
German and the French traditions of citizenship, the former rooted in Ger- 
man idealism, the latter in the republican tradition of the French revolution. 
Brubaker starts his analysis from the observation that the rate of naturaliz- 
ation of immigrants in France is higher than in Germany. What authors such 
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as Hoffmann and Brubaker neglect is the history of exclusion of newcomers 
and minorities in national states that have had a republican tradition, e.g., 
France and the United States. As Smith (1988) has convincingly argued, 
republican ideals were successfully used to exclude women and ‘racial’ minor- 
ities such as African Americans from the political sphere, well into the 20th 
century. 
Jiirgen Habermas (1992) presents arguments to debunk the notion that 
citizenship should be based upon ethnic and cultural criteria, such as assimi- 
lation into German culture. In his view there is an historical relationship 
between nation and citizenship; yet, this does not preclude an understanding 
of membership that is based on participation in the polity and not on the 
assimilation to a particular culture. Thus, Habermas favors a participatory 
approach to membership and rights in a polity. He balances the right to 
self-determination of each nation state - often advanced by communitarian 
arguments - and the rights of migrants to participate in the community in 
which they settle and have access to full membership. 
Dieter Oberndorfer (1989), a specialist in international relations, also 
moves beyond the exclusive focus on the (republican) national state to discuss 
the nexus between cosmopolitan human rights that have pre- and supra- 
national validity and the republic as a principle of political organization 
whose main purpose it is to guarantee and enforce human rights. Oberndorfer 
transcends the understanding of the national state as a closed system and 
asks questions about citizenship in a world of transnational migration and a 
national organization of the distribution of membership and rights. 
Baubock (1993) takes into account the transnational aspect of migration. 
First, he urges easier access to citizenship for de facto immigrants. On the 
other hand, he also supports the concept of denizenship (Wohnburgerschufr) 
that would grant certain political rights also to long-term foreign citizens. 
Since immigrants (first generation) rarely break their ties with the country 
of origin (e.g. sending remittances), Baubock also conceives of an emigration 
citizenship (Auwandererbiirgerschu~r). The extension of denizenship (rights) 
could be one way to protect the status of extrucommunituri in a unifying 
European Community. The problem with denizenship is, however, as critics 
have, pointed out, a potential ‘devaluation’ of national citizenship. Schuck 
and Smith, for example, hold a dichotomous concept of citizenship (1985). 
In their view the extension of denizenship could lead migrants not to apply for 
citizenship in the country of settlement at all. Nevertheless, those European 
countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands who have granted denizenship 
rights to migrants, for example voting rights on the local level, seem to have 
had positive experiences in regard to political participation of the immigrants 
involved (Rath 1990). 
Quite unlike its use in Canadian politics and its meaning in Australian 
politics (cf. Weber 1987), multicultural society in the German context has 
not primarily referred to a specific strategy to promote languages and cultures 
of immigrants. Rather, it has served as a roof for all those very divergent 
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views that reject assimilation strategies that were promoted by the federal 
government during the 1980s. Multiculturalist positions span a wide spectrum 
ranging from a vision of non-conflictual ethnic relations and cultural auton- 
omy for immigrant groups to more concrete proposals to integrate policies 
of asylum, immigration and integration. In the literature we find at least two 
views. First, there is what could be called a liberal position. It corresponds to 
positions represented by an ‘open republic’ (Oberndorfer) or an ‘unfinished 
republic’ (Hoffmann), i.e. arguments that ground membership in a polity in 
a republican tradition. A practical implication of this position would be a 
transition from the dominant concept of ius sanguinis to ius soli as a basis 
for membership. According to this view ethnic groups should not have special 
privileges in the public domain, e.g. ethnically-specific educational institu- 
tions. A second position in the multiculturalist debate, put forward within 
the Green Party, has emphasized the cultural autonomy of ethnic groups, a 
view that conflicts with a liberal argument because it ultimately implies that 
ethnic groups have wide-ranging autonomy in cultural affairs (cf. Die Grunen 
1990). 
Two practitioners in the field who are associated with the ‘Office of Multi- 
cultural Affairs’ of the city of Frankfurt, have written the most comprehen- 
sive study of the ‘experiment of multicultural democracy’. They speak of ‘the 
multicultural society . . . (as) an immigration society’ (Cohn-Bendit & Schmid 
1992: 137). This description refers to the argument that high levels of immi- 
gration, ensuing social conflicts and violence are constitutive elements of 
Germany that has always been an immigration country. Their study raises 
questions such as: Is it desirable to aim for a plural society with autonomous 
cultural rights and even special privileges for discriminated ethnic (immi- 
grant) minorities? Or  should policies be guided by the principle of equal 
treatment of all ethnic groups, irrespective of their position in the political 
and socioeconomic hierarchies? 
Talking about ‘the experiment of a multiculturalist democracy’ also means 
considering specific German difficulties in dealing with ethnic pluralism. 
German laws and regulations of membership in the polity have meant that 
even second-generation immigrants are foreigners. Thus, some of the ‘classic’ 
solutions to deal with ethnic conflicts cannot be applied, e.g. territorial and 
cultural autonomy, civil or political rights movements (e.g. SOS Racisme in 
France), and demands for ‘affirmative action’ (Heckmann 1992: 240-41; cf. 
Kimminich 1985). Since de facto immigrants have been excluded from politi- 
cal (voting) rights, it is not surprising that we do not find them in the formal 
political sphere although they have become members of established parties, 
e.g., the Social Democratic Party. As in other European countries, the 
first generation of Turkish de facto immigrants, for example, have focussed 
primarily on politics in their homeland. This tendency is changing slowly: 
Immigrants are becoming more active in the politics of educational and social 
policy on the local level (Ozcan 1989). A field that has received much less 
attention is the political integration of former ‘guestworkers’ in unions and 
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in institutions of economic democracy at the company level (Kuhne et al. 
1988). 
Little attention has been devoted to the distribution of social rights. Hubert 
Heinelt (1993) places his analysis in the context of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
typology of welfare regimes. He argues that in ‘conservative and continental’ 
type regimes (e.g., Germany) discrimination against immigrants is more an 
effect of status attribution by the state (citizenship laws and status regu- 
lations) than in ‘liberal’ regimes, In ‘liberal’ regimes (e.g., United States) 
discrimination is much more determined by market processes than in Ger- 
many. More specifically, he argues that the organization of the German 
national state allowed it to distinguish human rights from citizen’s rights. 
The latter do not only include political but also social rights. He goes on to 
claim that in those national states that have organized access to membership 
on the principle of ius soli (e.g., France) the problem of integration is not 
so much on the level of rights but more in terms of social discrimination 
based on ascriptive ethnic criteria. Heinelt presents evidence from the Ger- 
man case. He looks at social rights and benefits that different immigrant 
groups receive. There is a hierarchy based on access to membership. For 
example, due to German citizenship law, ethnic Germans from Eastern 
Europe have full access to social rights, whereas asylum seekers do not. 
This argument can be specified in two ways. First, those migrants who 
hold a permanent residency permit have access to a similar set of social rights 
as German citizens and ethnic Germans (Franz 1989). In regard to social 
rights, the difference between ius soli and ius sanguinis is only relevant with 
regard to ethnic Germans. Regarding temporary labor migrants and asylum 
seekers, there are similar hierarchies of access to social rights for migrants 
even in ‘liberal’ regimes such as the United States that are characterized by 
ius soli regulations (Fuchs 1991: 477-481). In sum, the laws of welfare states 
as different as the United States and Germany are characterized by access 
to social rights for immigrants with a permanent residence permit that is not 
closely related to political membership. 
Second, the distinction between discrimination through the ‘market’, on 
the one hand, and the ‘state’, on the other hand, does not further our 
understanding of processes of integration, inclusion and exclusion of immi- 
grants in labor markets, social services and benefit systems. Rather, as com- 
parative empirical studies have shown, different types of welfare regimes go 
hand in hand with distinct forms of politico-economic inclusion and exclusion. 
In a study of the transition from school to work among Turkish and German 
youth in the Federal Republic and Mexican American and European Amer- 
ican youth in the United States during the 1980s, one of the main findings 
was that the policies of a regime made a difference to  exclusion. In a class- 
based corporatist social and labor market policy system immigrants mainly 
suffered from unemployment (Turks in Germany) while in an ethnically- 
segmented pluralist regime the main form of exclusion has been income 
poverty (Mexican Americans in the USA) (Faist 1993). 
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Horst Afheldt (1993) claims that continued high levels of East-West and 
North-South migration do indeed pose a threat to certain indigenous groups 
in the labor and housing market and in social services. According to Afheldt 
these developments call into question the ‘welfare state rule’ in German 
politics (Sozialstaatspostulut), i.e., the attempt of the welfare state to  de- 
crease income inequalities, guarantee a certain level of equality of oppor- 
tunity and thus secure economic integration of its citizens. However, there 
are no empirical studies to substantiate this far-reaching and gloomy con- 
clusion. On the basis of scarce empirical studies, it could be hypothesized 
that certain marginalized groups in the labor market - indigenous and immi- 
grants (e.g., former Turkish ‘guestworkers’) - compete with new immigrants 
in the housing and labor market. The studies that do exist show that in 
recent years (1988-1991) new immigrants were successfully integrated into 
labor markets, and overall, contributed to more revenues than costs to the 
welfare state (cf. Barabas et  al. 1992). 
The interesting question then concerns the perception of immigrants as 
economic competitors and their perceived willingness or unwillingness to 
assimilate to the culture of the country of settlement. Historically, in Western 
Europe, North America and Australia, labor unions have been the most 
vigorous proponents of immigration control. Unions saw high levels of immi- 
gration as dangerous signs of wage dumping and increased competition in 
the housing market. In Germany, during the 1960s, unions were part of a 
neo-corporatist policy-making mechanism that regulated the recruitment and 
integration of what were deemed to be temporary ‘guestworkers’. The politics 
of immigration were not conflictual between the three main actors in labor 
markets, unions, employer associations and state institutions such as the 
Ministry of Labor. During the 1980s, in the context of high levels of immi- 
gration, especially of ethnic Germans and asylum seekers, a perceived crisis 
of the welfare state, and the difficulties of German unification, a new debate 
over the effects of immigration emerged. In the 1980s it was not unions but 
(right-wing) populist parties and politicians that were the main actors urging 
immigration restrictions based on xenophobic appeals. 
Ethnicization: the construction of ethnic boundaries 
One of the most challenging problems concerns the construction of boun- 
daries between groups that are reflected in perceptions of ‘we’ and the 
‘other’. After World War I1 immigration of expellees, ethnic Germans, labor 
migrants and asylum seekers into Germany has gone hand in hand with the 
construction of boundaries. In the 1980s and early 1990s the rise of right- 
wing populist parties, the discourse on racism, and the steep increase in 
violence against certain groups of migrants such as Turks and asylum seekers 
are only the most visible forms of an increased importance of boundary 
formation towards ‘others’. One example of boundary formation and mobiliz- 
ation is the use of religion and culture (Islam) in defining Turkish de facto 
immigrants: Muslims are thought to be unwilling to assimilate to German 
culture and thus not deemed to be fit to become German citizens. Another 
example is the distinction between ‘political’ refugees and ‘economic’ refu- 
gees: Only ‘political’ refugees are thought to have a legitimate claim to 
social benefits (e.g., Sozialhilfe). All these examples hint at boundaries that 
separate ‘us’ (the Germans?) from ‘them’ (certain immigrant groups). 
Nevertheless, there are few theoretical and empirical studies on boundary 
formation that take Frederik Barth’s (1969) work seriously. He suggested 
that ethnic markers such as language, religion and ‘culture’ are the manifes- 
tation of boundaries that separate insiders from  outsider^.^ The literature 
discussed in the following section offers some hypotheses that could be 
pursued in further systematic empirical research. 
A fundamental debate underlying the analysis of ethnicization is the rel- 
evance of ethnic identity and ethnic differentiation in modern states. Esser 
(1988) argues that continued functional differentiation of society will ulti- 
mately erode the basis for differentiation along ethnic lines. In contrast, 
Nassehi (1990) contends that in functionally differentiated societies the prob- 
lem of integration is intrinsically related to ethnic differentiation. He views 
ethnic differentiation as a function of social integration of modern societies. 
According to Nassehi ethnic differentiation may play a role above all in those 
situations in which economic conflicts occur, e.g. access to jobs and other 
goods determining life-chances. Nevertheless, ethnic differentiation is not 
the only or the main process that accompanies responses to functional differ- 
entiation and crises in modern societies. In this view ethnic differentiation, 
e.g., the formation of ethnic identities, serves as a basis for social integration 
in excluding ‘others’, i.e., foreigners, ethnic Germans, ‘racial’ minorities, 
and asylum seekers. Nassehi concludes his discussion with an interesting 
historical claim: He observes that ethnic conflicts and self-identification may 
have less of a social integrative function in the late 20th when compared to 
the late 19th and early 20th century. Causes may be found in a prospering 
welfare state, the cultural liberalization of society and the individualization 
of personal life-histories. However, in the face of mounting opposition to 
immigration in Western national states and ethnicization of conflicts around 
jobs, housing and social services, we may fruitfully reverse this hypothesis 
and thus use it as a point of departure for further inquiries into contemporary 
processes of ethnicization: High levels of immigration and conflicts over 
distribution of social goods in welfare states may well present the fertile 
ground in which an ethnicization of welfare state politics has taken place in 
recent years. 
Following Max Weber, Gero Lenhardt (1990) argues that the formation 
of ethnic identity is a result of complex processes of rationalization. He 
thinks that the bureaucratization of daily life through bureaucratic agencies 
of the modern state indeed furthers ethnocentrist tendencies. Lenhardt draws 
upon Glazer and Moynihan’s (1975) account of affirmative action policies. 
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In the United States, affirmative action legislation gave excluded minorities 
(e.g., African Americans and Hispanics) a wedge to claim rights, e.g. access 
to jobs. In turn, those negatively affected (e.g., white males) mobilized and 
charged ‘reverse discrimination’. Lenhardt hypothesizes that in this case the 
welfare state itself has been a source of ethnic differentiation and what we 
have called ethnicization of politics. For example, in enforcing the rights of 
historically discriminated ethnic and racial minorities in access to jobs and 
housing, the American welfare state bureaucracy uses the very same ethnic 
and racial markers to define who has and who has no right to preferential 
treatment. These situations can serve as a point of departure for political 
entrepreneurs to rally around ethnic and racial markers, both potential ben- 
eficiaries and potential losers. 
Lenhardt’s account of the welfare state as a source of ethnicization of 
politics applies to the United States. Closer at hand, German unification is 
a very good example to illustrate the structural conditions under which 
ethnicization of welfare state politics may take place. On the one hand, 
German unification may have led to an increased xenophobic reaction to 
‘others’, for example asylum seekers and de facto immigrants of Turkish 
descent (cf. Bielefeld 1991). On the other hand, the problems associated 
with unification, for example conflicts over the burdens of ‘rebuilding’ what 
used to be the German Democratic Republic, may lead to a regionally based 
ethnicization between the populations in the East and the West of Germany 
(Offe 1992). In both instances ethnicization is not necessarily associated with 
an outwardly aggressive nationalism in German politics. Thus, for example, 
some analysts have described nationalism after German unification not as a 
form of exaggerated national feeling or an ideology with externally expan- 
sionist tendencies. Rather, Funke speaks of a ‘fragmented and defen- 
sive nationalism’ that is directed against domestic and not external ‘enemies’. 
The targets of this nationalism include selected groups of foreigners, such as 
Sinti and Roma, asylum seekers and Turkish ‘guestworkers’. In Funke’s view 
this reactive form of nationalism arises in the context of the perception of 
crisis (e.g., unemployment and disorientation in the process of German 
unification, and latent dispositions of nationalism (1991: 7-8). 
We know very little about the actual construction of boundaries or  the 
mobilization of ‘difference’. Manfrass (1991: 21 1-230) gives some indication 
in his analysis of political discourse around immigration and integration in 
France and Germany. In a comparative study of North Africans in France 
and Turks in Germany (in which Manfrass takes the commonalities of immi- 
gration situation in European countries as a point of departure), he finds 
very similar arguments in both countries. Boundaries towards ‘others’ gather 
around religion, i.e. Islam in regard to North Africans in France and Turks 
in Germany. Much more research is needed to uncover the continuities and 
novel developments in constructing ethnic difference in Germany in the 
context of high levels of immigration (cf. Leveau & Ruf 1991). 
One of the forms of the political organization of ethnicity, i.e., ethniciz- 
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ation of politics, that has received much public and academic attention 
has been the resurgence of nationalist populist political parties and steeply 
increased violence against certain groups of foreigners in Germany. Looking 
at the rise of right-wing populist parties offers one way to trace the signifi- 
cance of the politicization of migration issues. 
The following discussion will deal with the emergence of right-wing popul- 
ist parties such as the Republicans (Republikaner) and the Deutsche Volks- 
union (DVLI). Populism, most analysts agree, is characterized by a mixture 
of demands that point towards both radical democracy and reactionary politi- 
cal views (Backes 1990). Often, populism does not fit the left/right pattern 
of political cleavages. Populism has anti-elitist and anti-intellectual character- 
istics, i.e. the ‘healthy common sense’ of the masses is held in stark opposition 
to the rule of experts and elites. Populist positions also claim that ‘special 
interests’ have to be subordinated to what is perceived and defined by popul- 
ist entrepreneurs to be the general will. Thus, populist positions have strong 
anti-pluralist tendencies, combined with a penchant for simple solutions for 
complex problems and an idealization of a distant and supposedly much 
better past. Issues such as immigration and integration that cut across estab- 
lished class and religious cleavages (the main cleavage lines of ‘old politics’ 
in Germany) are thus attractive themes around which populist rhetoric may 
rally supporters. 
The German literature on populism offers two, not necessarily exclusive 
interpretations of the rise of right-wing populist renaissance that shed some 
light on the connection between immigration and the political mobilization 
of ‘ethnic’ markers. A first explanation emphasizes socio-economic changes 
as an explanation for the rise of right-wing populist dispositions among the 
population and the support of these parties (cf. Betz 1991). This literature 
deals with two sets of explanatory factors. First, rapid and large-scale changes 
have led to a ‘two-third society’ (Zweidrittel-Gesellschuft). For example, 
segmented or dual labor markets have developed in Western states. This 
segmentation is further exacerbated by changes in the global division of 
labor. These labor markets are split into future-oriented sectors with secure 
well-paid jobs and peripheral, declining sectors with jobs that are charac- 
terized by the constant threat of unemployment. These socio-economic 
changes produce victims, e .g. the long-term unemployed and the marginally 
employed. Second, increased insecurities during the individual life-course 
are thought to contribute to increasing disorientation. According to this view 
the educational revolution and increased demand for well-educated labor has 
resulted in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, ‘postmodern individ- 
uals’ have a wider range of choice available. On the other hand, the cost of 
the expansion of options is the loss of stability and security in the life-world. 
In short, labor market dualization and the individualization of risks and 
opportunities have resulted in increased insecurity, fear and feeling of power- 
lessness among the ‘victims of modernization’. In particular, this applies to 
the victims of modernization, i.e. long-term unemployed, those employed in 
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marginal positions, high school dropouts. This view sees rightwing populist 
appeals to be most successful among members of these groups, i.e. those 
groups are most receptive to right-wing populism that feel most threatened 
by economic, cultural and social decline. By implication those are thought 
to be least receptive who belong to the core of the modern welfare state. 
Obviously, this kind of explanation is highly reminiscent of attempts to 
explain the electoral success of NSDAP in the early thirties (Geiger 1930). 
If this hypothesis has some validity, we should be able to find a close 
connection between social-structural characteristics and vote for the Republi- 
kaner. Roth (1990) found a higher propensity to vote republican among 
voters with lower levels of education and social status (cf. Hennig et al. 1991: 
154-55). However, there are higher than average levels of support for 
right-wing parties among other groups as well, e.g. among the self-employed. 
One of the main proponents of this view, Wilhelm Heitmeyer has applied 
this perspective to explain violence against foreigners among youth (1992). 
Nevertheless, his own data does not support his hypothesis that low self- 
esteem combined with marginal educational or labor market positions, low 
levels of secure group attachment and negative views of one’s own future is 
positively correlated with a tendency to carry right-wing dispositions 
(Bommes & Scherr 1992: 216). Rather than pursuing interpretations that 
deterministically reduce the dispositions to support right-wing populism to 
changes in individual life-chances and personality deficits, other analysts have 
asked to which groups populist rhetoric may appeal and why. Right-wing 
populists are not thought to be the mere victims of modernization. Thus, for 
example, Bommes and Scherr (1992: 210-11) perceive of populist discourse 
and arguments as a pool in which individuals from very different backgrounds 
find attractive arguments. The support of populist arguments cannot simply 
be reduced to specific socio-economic situations and the specific personality 
traits of persons. This view would allow us to introduce political actors, such 
as governments and parties, in the process of ethnicization of politics. 
A second explanation for the emergence of right-wing populism empha- 
sizes structural changes in the party systems and correlated ‘value’ changes 
as root causes. Leggewie (1989), in his study of the Republikaner, argues 
that the disintegration of major parties, in particular the Christian Democrats 
(CDU), offered a political vacuum into which right-wing parties have swiftly 
moved since the early 1980s. Leggewie’s premise is that the German Christian 
Democrats were not a conservative party such as the British Tories. Instead, 
the CDU combined three wings: national-conservatives, catholic labor and 
economic liberals. The Republikaner seized their political opportunities when 
these three wings disintegrated. Leggewie goes on to claim that this develop- 
ment involves a certain ‘normalization’ of German politics, the party system 
is beginning to look like that of other Western democracies. Leggewie’s 
analysis points towards common European trends in the development of 
right-wing parties. However, we learn nothing about why the Republikaner 
were so successful in ‘ethnicizing’ German politics. Minkenberg (1992) in- 
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terprets the emergence of right-wing parties in Germany as a reaction to 
value change on the left. This view has been inspired by Ronald Ingelhart’s 
seminal studies on ‘value change’ in Western democracies across generational 
cohorts. In Minkenberg’s perspective the ‘postmodern’ left has a ‘new right’ 
as a concomitant counterpart. The emphasis of populist rhetoric on individual 
incentive is paralleled by an exaggeration of individualism in the ‘postmod- 
ern’ left. For Minkenberg both the ‘new left’ and the ‘new right’ are phenom- 
ena of ‘new politics’. For example, the hallmark of parties such as the 
Repubfikaner is that they do not attempt to mobilize a distinct socially 
definable group. From this observation Minkenberg concludes that new right- 
wing parties espouse a one-dimensional ideology, i.e. a populist strategy that 
appeals to a variety of groups. However, from this analysis we learn very 
little about the actors who are involved in right-wing populist politics and 
their strategies of mobilization around issues such as immigration and the 
defense of the welfare state. 
Processes of ethnicization of politics are characterized by constructing and 
mobilizing boundaries against selected groups of immigrants and/or ethnic 
and racial minorities. One hypothesis could be that the attraction of populism 
is the connection between the ‘defense’ of the welfare state and the exclusion 
of selected groups of immigrants from social benefits who did not participate 
previously in the social security system. Populist rhetoric fuses the neo- 
conservative discourse of individual merit with an appeal to secure the wel- 
fare state against intruders who threaten to erode the economic and cultural 
foundations of society. Thus, on the one hand, populist parties have indeed 
taken up the rhetoric of individual merit that was a hallmark of neo-conserv- 
ative rhetoric during the 1980s in Western Europe and North America (cf. 
Andersen & Bjgrklund 1990). On the other hand, populist discourse in 
Germany and other Western European countries has not-called for a rollback 
of the welfare state as neo-conservatives did in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Rather, it has helped to elevate the defense of the welfare state benefits 
(e.g., old age pensions) against ‘floods’ of immigrants to a much-discussed 
issue on the political agenda. The Front National in France seems to have 
been the most successful instance of populist agenda setting in regard to 
immigration and the welfare state. Partly, this has also been the theme of 
the German Republikaner. It is in this sense that we could speak of ‘defensive 
welfare chauvinism’. Therefore, in order to understand more about the 
connection between the resurgence of populism and agenda-setting in regard 
to immigration, we also need to consider distributional conflicts in welfare 
states. There seems to be a repertoire of issues related to distributional 
conflicts in the welfare states which populist arguments have used to mobilize 
boundaries of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. These boundaries are not necessarily di- 
rected against immigrants and could very well include domestic groups. 
What is new is certainly not ethnicization. Yet, the context in which the 
politicization of ethnicity occurs has been undergoing significant changes. 
Citizens in the (German) welfare state have claims to resources. For a large 
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part these claims are founded on participation in the labor market. According 
to the prevailing equivalency principle (Aquivalenzprinzip), pensions, for 
example, are paid to those who have earlier contributed to the funds. In a 
situation in which these claims have become contested, it is not surprising 
that those who have not ‘earned’ their right, e.g., asylum seekers, are not 
considered to have legitimate claims on the resources of the welfare state. 
However, not all immigrant groups who have not ‘earned’ their right are 
thought to have illegitimate claims. For example, the claims of ethnic Ger- 
mans have been much less contested so far than those of asylum seekers. In 
sum, the definition of citizenship and the understanding of membership do 
play an important role in who is admitted and who gets what set of citizenship 
rights - but also whose claims are contested. 
Perspectives for future research: beyond the national state 
In sum, German political science research has not dealt self-consciously with 
immigration and integration of immigrants as processes of the distribution 
and constestation of rights. In view of current conflicts around immigration 
and integration and distributional conflicts in the welfare state, the issues of 
rights and membership deserve more attention than they have received so 
far. 
This review has almost exclusively focused on domestic aspects of the 
transnational phenomena of immigration, integration and ethnicization. For 
the most part researchers have looked ‘at the national (welfare) state as a 
closed system that has not been an integral part of transnational migratory 
processes. Thus, academic debates and research in Germany have neglected 
the foreign policy, international and transnational characteristics of migration 
(for exceptions, see Lohrmann & Manfrass 1974 and the review of the 
state of art by Blaschke 1993). The relationship between migration and 
international relations covers states and individuals in both sending and 
receiving countries and the patterns discernible at the level of the interna- 
tional system and its regional subdivisions. 
Given the central role of the debate over the constitutional right to asylum 
for political refugees, it is particularly astonishing to notice how few studies 
deal with the refugee problem in international perspective. Research on the 
causation of refugee flows and the sociological definition of refugees is just 
emerging (Opitz 1988; Blaschke & Germershausen 1992). 
Suggestions for further research on immigration can be derived from 
Abram de Swaan’s work (1992) who views international migration as one of 
the processes that intimately connect social policies of developed and de- 
veloping countries. Among other things de Swaan explores the reasons the 
‘rich’ countries in the North might have in supporting the evolution of a 
transnational social policy regime, e.g., helping ‘poor’ countries in the South 
to institutionalize a minimal structure of social service delivery. If it is true 
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that from a normative point of view the protection of social rights in the 
North can be seen as a legitimate reason to control immigration from the 
South then the question does not solely concern the contested granting of 
social-rights to migrants in the countries of the North. It also concerns social 
rights of populations in the South. 
Notes 
1. There were some significant differences between East and West Germany in regard to the 
size of the migrant population and their regions of origin. Compared to about seven percent 
of the total population in the Federal Republic foreigners in the East constituted only one 
percent. They can be subdivided in three categories. First, contract laborers from other 
socialist countries (e.g., Cuba, Vietnam, Mozambique); second, students; and third, a small 
group of political asylants from states in which communists were persecuted (e.g., Chile) (cf. 
Kruger-Potratz 1991; on the legal status of migrants before and after unification, see Cu 
1992). 
2. Asylum seekers come to Germany by asking for political asylum: ‘Every politically persecuted 
individual has a right to asylum.’ (Art. 16 I1 2 GG) Germany is unique in that it grants an 
individual claim to asylum for all those who are politically persecuted. Germany has, by 
international standards, an exceptionally liberal asylum law, guaranteeing entry and an 
individual right to a lawful procedure (Rechtsweggarantie, guaranteed by Art., 19 IV 1 GG) 
that extends beyond the institutional guarantee of the Geneva Convention. The Geneva 
Convention grounds asylum in the prerogative of sovereign states while German Basic Law 
gives individuals a claim to asylum. On a juridical level the positions taken were those who 
wanted to replace Article 16 by an institutional guarantee (Hailbronner 1987) and those who 
wanted to keep it in its original form (Pfaff 1992). Article 16 was replaced by a new Article 
16a that took effect in July 1993: Among other restrictions all those asylum seekers can now 
be turned back at the border and thus would not have a constitutionally guaranteed right to 
asylum who entered the Federal Republic from neighboring ‘safe countries’ (all neighboring 
countries have been declared to be ‘safe countries’), those who came from countries declared 
to be ’free of persecution’ (e.g. Romania, Hungary, Ghana, India), and those asylum seekers 
whose application was already denied in member states of the European Community. 
3. ‘The critical focus of investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that 
defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses. . . If a group maintains its identity 
when members interact with others, this entails criteria for membership and ways of signalling 
membership and exclusion’ (Barth 1969: 15). 
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